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Abstract—Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs) aim at en-
hancing road safety and providing a comfortable driving envi-
ronment by delivering early warning and infotainment messages
to the drivers. Jamming attacks, however, pose a significant
threat to their performance. In this paper, we propose a novel
Relative Speed Estimation Algorithm (RSEA) of a moving vehicle
that approaches a Transmitter (Tx) - Receiver (Rx) pair, that
interferes with their Radio Frequency (RF) communication by
conducting a Denial of Service (DoS) attack. Our scheme is
completely passive and uses a pilot-based received signal without
hardware or computational cost to, firstly, estimate the combined
channel between the transmitter - receiver and jammer - receiver
and secondly, to estimate the jamming signal and the relative
speed between the jammer - receiver using the RF Doppler
shift. Moreover, the relative speed metric exploits the Angle of
Projection (AOP) of the speed vector of the jammer in the axis of
its motion in order to form a two-dimensional representation of
the geographical area. Our approach can effectively be applied
for any form of jamming signal and is proven to have quite
accurate performance, with a Mean Absolute Error (MAE) value
of approximately 10% compared to the optimal zero MAE value
under different jamming attack scenarios.
I. INTRODUCTION
Autonomous vehicles, capable of navigating in unpre-
dictable real-world environments with little human feedback
are a reality today [1]. Autonomous vehicle control imposes
very strict security requirements on the wireless communi-
cation channels that are used by a fleet of vehicles [2].
This is necessary in order to ensure reliable connectivity [3].
Moreover, the Intelligent Vehicle Grid technology, introduced
in [4], allows the car to become a formidable sensor platform,
absorbing information from the environment, other cars, or
the driver, and feed it to other vehicles and infrastructure so
as to assist in safe navigation, pollution control, and traffic
management. The vehicle grid essentially becomes an Internet
of Things (IoT) for vehicles, namely the Internet of Vehicles
(IoV), that is capable of making its own decisions when
driving customers to their destinations [5].
The connected autonomous vehicles (CAVs) that use the
wireless vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication has become
essential for the operation of a modern vehicle [6]. Wireless
communications, however are vulnerable to a wide range of
attacks [7], [8]. An RF jamming attack consists of radio
signals maliciously emitted to disrupt legitimate communi-
cations. Jamming attacks are a big threat to any type of
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wireless network. With the rise in safety-critical vehicular
wireless applications, this is likely to become a constraining
issue for their deployment in the future. A subcategory of
jamming attacks is the Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks, which
are targeting the availability of network services. Of special
interest are the mobile jammers, which impose an added strain
on vehicular networks (VANETs). The accurate prediction of
the behavior of the jammer such as its speed becomes critical
for providing a swift reaction to an attack.
In this work, we propose a novel metric that captures the
relative speed between the jammer (Jx) and the receiver (Rx).
We also propose the Relative Speed Estimation Algorithm
(RSEA) that is a completely passive estimation method that
uses pilot-based received signals at the receiver to, firstly,
estimate the channel between the transmitter - receiver and
jammer - receiver and, secondly the jamming signal and
thirdly, to estimate the relative speed between the jammer
- receiver using the RF Doppler shift properly. This is the
first work in the literature, according to our knowledge, that
proposes an algorithm for speed estimation of malicious RF
jammers.
Problem Statement: In addition to RF jamming, wireless
communication between a transmitter (Tx) and a receiver
can be impaired by unintentional interference and multiple
access control (MAC) protocol collisions. Jammers can exhibit
arbitrary behavior in order to disrupt and thwart communica-
tion with a form of DoS attack [9]. In the general case, RF
jamming reduces the receiver signal to interference and noise
ratio (SINR), a problem that can be addressed with classic
communication algorithms. However, in several applications
it is critical to detect accurately the presence of a jammer, i.e.
the precise reason behind the reduction in SINR, the packet-
delivery-ratio (PDR), and more importantly, the nature of the
attack. Consequently, it is difficult to determine whether the
reason for the SINR reduction is an intentional jamming attack
or unintentional interference. The challenge in detecting an
RF jamming attack is that the information that is available
for the jammer is typically minimal and it can be derived
from the useful signal possibly mixed with other types of
arbitrary interference in the area. By estimating the relative
speed between a legitimate vehicle and a jammer, we can
conclude if a high interference scenario has been provoked
intentionally with the form of a DoS attack by an attacker that
approaches the victim or has been provoked unintentionally
by an area with significant RF interference. Specifically, if
the estimated relative speed metric is around zero, we can
infer that the jammer is moving with the same speed with the
receiver. On the other hand, if the estimated relative speed has
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Figure 1: The Network Topology in which the orange vehicle
is the jammer that approaches the Tx−Rx pair from a AOP
(θ) angle. This figure also includes the multipath fading effects
by a static object
a high value, we can conclude that the jammer is moving at
quite different speed than that of the receiver. Of particular
interest is the higher level behavior of a jammer, like its
motion/movement relative to the Tx - Rx pair.
Our solution: Using the jamming signal at the receiver
we estimate the relative speed metric (∆u) that is based on
the difference or sum between the velocities of the jammer
and the receiver. This passively estimated metric also includes
information regarding the Angle of Projection (AOP) of the
jammed signal. Our scheme uses only the signal at the
receiver under the presence of a jammer to characterize the
behavior/motion of the jammer (if the Jx is approaching or
moving away from the Rx) using the RF Doppler shift. We
also adopt a pilot-based method for the channel estimation
between Tx - Rx since it is suitable for fast varying channels,
like VANETs, because the channel is directly estimated by
training symbols or the pilot tone that are known a priori to
the receiver.
The contributions of the paper are three-fold:
• A completely passive pilot-based scheme is proposed
that is based on RF communication between Tx − Rx
being interfered by a jammer in the area. However, we
do not apply the proposed RSEA for estimating only
speed of the Tx [10]. We try from this point-to-point
communication to gather as much information as possible
regarding jammer’s behavior, such as all the combined
multipath channels among Tx,Rx, Jx, jammer’s relative
speed value and the jamming signal.
• In addition, the proposed relative speed metric uses novel
physical location features, because it includes the AOP of
the jammer.
• The effective usage of the estimated relative speed for a
future jamming detection algorithm is outlined.
It has to be highlighted that the proposed RSEA can also
be applied to any form of jamming signal.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section
II presents the related work, whilst Section III analyzes the
network topology, the system model analysis and the wireless
channel model. Section IV presents the location aware relative
speed metric and Section V analytically describes the proposed
RSEA. Section VI presents the experimental evaluation of the
proposed RSEA and provides comparison between different
scenarios. Section VII justifies the experimental behavior of
the proposed relative speed metric and describes real appli-
cations that the metric can be used. Finally, Section VIII
concludes the paper and gives some directions for future work.
II. RELATED WORK
A. RF Jamming
RF jamming has been extensively studied in the con-
text of classical 802.11 networks without accounting for
the particularities of car-to-car communications. Besides the
differences in PHY design of 802.11p compared to other
802.11 amendments, the propagation conditions of VANETs
are fundamentally different due to the highly dispersive and
rapidly changing vehicular environment. A lot of different
jamming attacks have been studied in VANETs [11]. The
two most important categories of jamming attacks are the
constant jamming and the reactive jamming. Constant jam-
ming transmits random generated data on the channel without
checking the state of the channel (idle or not). The reactive
jamming happens only when the attacker senses activity on
the channel. In [12] authors observe that constant, periodic, but
also reactive RF jammer can hinder communication over large
propagation areas, which would threaten road safety. Reactive
jamming attacks reach a high jamming efficiency and can
even improve the energy-efficiency of the jammer in several
application scenarios [13],[14]. Also, they can easily and
efficiently be implemented on commercially available off-the-
shelf (COTS) hardware such as USRP radios [15],[16],[17].
But, more importantly, reactive jamming attacks are harder
to detect due to the attack model, which allows jamming
signal to be hidden behind transmission activities performed
by legitimate users [16],[18],[19].
A different category of attacks are the pilot-based attacks
against OFDM and OFDMA signals [20]. These attacks seek
to manipulate information used by the equalization algorithm
to cause errors to a significant number of symbols. However,
we do not evaluate this type of attacks because the point of
interest of this paper is the DoS attacks that are targeting the
availability and no the integrity of packets. In order to be ro-
bust against pilot tone jamming attacks, OFDM and OFDMA
systems must randomize their subcarrier locations and values.
For the mitigation of this type of RF jamming attacks, optimal
power allocation with user scheduling techniques are proposed
[21], utilizing also the technique of uncoordinated frequency
hopping (UFH) [22]. UFH implies the communication between
transmitter and receiver through a randomly chosen frequency
channel unknown for both agents. In [23] authors highlight the
secrecy level of wireless networks under UFH, showing the
harmful security effect of broadband eavesdropper adversaries
capable of overhearing in multiple frequencies. In order to
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stop such eavesdroppers, authors propose the use of broadband
friendly jammers that cause interference on eavesdroppers.
The goal is to cause as much interference as possible to
eavesdroppers that are located in unknown positions, while
limiting the interference observed by the legitimate receiver.
The information about the location and speed of friendly
jammers are crucial for the above UHF schemes.
The effects of RF jamming can be alleviated using coop-
erative relaying schemes to where the vehicles outside of the
jamming area serve as relays to help forward the received
control channel signal to the victim vehicles through another
jamming-free service channel [24]. However, the jamming
scenarios that are used in this paper are limited since the
location of the jammer is assumed to be known in advance
(either being an RSU or a moving node). The anti-jamming
V2V communication in CAV networks through power selec-
tion in conjunction with channel selection is analyzed in [25].
Specifically, a brain-inspired cognitive dynamic system (CDS)
is applied to study V2V communications, and the general
structure of cognitive risk control (CRC) is tailored to analyze
and address the jamming problem in CAV networks. After
that, the power control is carried out first using reinforcement
learning method, the result of which is then examined by the
task-switch control. However, the mobility of vehicles and
the vehicle speeds are not considered in the channel model
and the complicity of the proposed method is questionable
too. By analyzing these articles we can conclude that the
jammer’s speed is a crucial metric for all the techniques that
try to address the jamming problem in RF communications in
VANETs.
B. Localization
A lot of work has covered matters of localization, which is
a fundamental challenge for any wireless network of nodes,
in particular, when nodes are mobile. In [26] the relative
positions and velocities (PVs) are estimated up to a rotation
and translation of an anchor-less mobile network, given two-
way communication capability between all the nodes. A least
squares based dynamic ranging algorithm is proposed, which
employs a classical Taylor series based approximation to
estimate pairwise distance derivatives efficiently without the
usage of Doppler shifts. However, this approach requires the
existence of a cluster of nodes with predefined initial locations.
On the contrary, the proposed RSEA algorithm do not require
any initial information for the location of vehicles. In [27],
authors propose a dual-level travel speed calculation model,
which is established under different levels of sample sizes.
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are widely used to maintain
the location information and rely on the tracking service only
when their location changes. In the proposed approach in
[28], the problem of tracking cooperative mobile nodes in
wireless sensor networks is addressed with the calculation of
Doppler shifts of the transmitting signal in combination with
a Kalman filter (by performing a constrained least-squares
optimization when a maneuver is detected). In [29], authors
suggest a method for joint estimation of the speed of a vehicle
and its distance to a roadside unit (RSU) for narrow-band
orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) commu-
nication systems. Spatial filtering and a maximum likelihood
(ML) algorithm is developed for distance estimation. The
vehicle speed is calculated using a kinematics model based
on the estimated distance and angle of arrival (AOA) values.
Comparing the aforementioned methods with our proposed
speed estimation method, it is obvious that the RSEA is
applicable to a VANET without any extra infrastructure such as
WSNs or complex calculations like Kalman filters and without
the need of deployment of RSUs for traffic recording. The
localization of a smart jammer, that is trying to hide his precise
location, has proved to be a difficult issue for the majority of
the aforementioned works, since position verification models
are susceptible to statistical errors. The survey paper [30] notes
the need for applying data fusion at the PHY layer of the
802.11p protocol of wireless access in vehicular environment
(WAVE) signals with upper layers for a vehicle positioning, a
method that our scheme is using.
C. Speed Estimation
Another group of papers propose speed estimation systems
that alert drivers about driving conditions and help them avoid
joining traffic jams using multi-class classifiers. ReVISE in
[31] proposes a multi-class SVM approach that uses features
from the RF signal. The proposed experimental testbed must
be established in a specific part of the road and is completed by
two stable access points and two monitor points. However, it
is doubtful whether it can be applied to a scenario with more
than one vehicles in the specific area such as the scenario
we are considering. Using a similar method, MUSIC [32]
is a subspace based AOA estimation algorithm that exploits
the eigen-structure of the covariance matrix of the received
signals on a multi-signal classifier using a uniform circular
array (UCA) antenna as extra hardware.
Covariance-based speed estimation schemes have also been
used for the estimation of the maximum Doppler spread, or
equivalently, the vehicle velocity that, is useful for improving
the performance of handoff algorithms [33].Specifically, the
authors in [33] propose a velocity estimator based on spectral
moments of in-phase and the quadrature-phase component or
the squared envelope of the received signal. The proposed
method has the least sample variance as compared to other
covariance-based methods. However, all the covariance-based
speed estimators do not assume shadowing in the channel
model and the improvement of their performance comes at
expense of more computational complexity and therefore an
added delay in computation time. Such models are not easily
applicable to a frequently changed V2V wireless channel with
many vehicles and obstacle where a lot of shadowing and
scattering effects exist. Only the authors in [10] propose a
velocity estimator that uses the statistics of the instantaneous
frequency (IF) of the received signal to estimate the velocity
and takes also into account the distribution of the scattered
component of the received signal and is also robust to path-
loss and shadowing. The only restrictive assumption of this
method for being applied in a VANET environment is that in
order to estimate the velocity, prior estimation of directivity
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parameter of the incoming waves is needed. The authors in
[34] proposed an algorithm that employs a modified nor-
malized auto-covariance of received signal power to estimate
the speed of mobile nodes. The simulation results indicate
that this algorithm is reliable to estimate mobile speed with
corresponding maximum Doppler shift up to 500Hz. However,
a great challenge of fast moving communications such as V2V
are the high Doppler shifts due to the relative motion between
communicating vehicles.
In [35] an algorithm that estimates the speed of a mobile
phone by matching time-series signal strength data to a known
signal strength trace from the same road is introduced. The
drawback of the correlation algorithm is the observation that
the signal strength profiles along roads remain relatively stable
over time, which is not so realistic for a VANET. Although
the results are more accurate than previous techniques that are
based on handoffs or phone localization, this method requires
the travelers to have their mobile phones open during their
travel. This is a limiting factor for a smart jammer, who has
its phone inactive to remain undetected. in comparison to
our proposed speed estimation method that can detect smart
jammers. In [36] a method for the estimation of speed for
mobile phone users using known WIFI Signal-to-Noise Ratio
(SNR) data from the past and time-domain features like mean,
maximum, and auto-correlation is proposed. However, it is
impossible in a frequently changed V2V channel the known
SNR samples from the past to be similar with new values. For
this reason, the proposed RSEA algorithm does not require any
training data about SNR or other PHY layer data. Whilst in
[37] two novel autocorrelation (ACF) based velocity estimators
are used, without requiring knowledge of the SNR of the link.
The drawback of both speed estimation techniques is that there
is some dependence of velocity on estimator performance and
there is also a limit to the velocity to up to 185km/h. On the
contrary, our proposed speed estimation method can estimate
quite large relative speeds without any speed limit.
In all the prior works, speed estimators that have been pro-
posed include training procedures in order to estimate traffic
congestion or other transportation performance metrics using
sensor measurements. However, the speed estimation problem
from a security perspective has been not widely investigated.
Only, in [38] the authors try to estimate the AOA of the
specular line of sight (LOS) component of signal received
from a given single antenna transmitter using a predefined
training sequence. The results show the optimality of the
training based ML-AOA estimator in the case of a randomly
generated jamming signal. However, the drawback of this ML-
AOA estimator is that this superior performance is subject to
the availability of a perfect CSI and the knowledge of jammer’s
strategy which is unlikely in a realistic system. Finally authors
in [39] introduced a new algorithm to estimate the mobile
terminal speed at base station (BS) in cellular networks.
This helps BS in estimating the channel Doppler shift, using
measured received signals at the BS. The performance of the
proposed algorithm is modeled in a Terrestrial Trunked Radio
(TETRA) network and the simulation has shown acceptable
results for a wide range of velocities and jammers. However,
using this algorithm the estimated Doppler shift depends on
the carrier frequency which is much smaller in a cellular
network (i.e. 396Mhz) compared to a VANET (i.e. 5,9GHz).
In contrast, in the speed estimation approached by this paper
the carrier frequency of a VANET is used without any impact
on performance of the speed estimation procedure.
Recently, extensive works present video-based speed esti-
mation techniques using single camera [40], [41]. Furthermore,
speed estimation techniques are used by applications for
traffic counting that are based on Wireless Magnetic Sensor
Networks (WMSNs). The authors in [42] propose a system
for traffic speed estimation which can effectively eliminate
the geomagnetic background interference. A morphological
filter is designed for removing the interference and extract-
ing the magnetic signatures of vehicles. However, all the
aforementioned works require specific infrastructure or sensor
such as camera, RAdio Detection And Ranging (RADAR),
Light Detection And Ranging (LIDAR), magnetic sensors and
Visible Light Detection and Ranging (ViLDAR) that built upon
sensing visible light variation of the vehicles headlamp [43].
All these sensors have a pretty high cost. In contrast, our
proposed method of speed estimation uses only the wireless
signal at the Rx for the estimation of the relative speed
metric ∆u between Jx and Rx without any need for extra
infrastructure. Last, a recent research [44] explores a novel
technique which could estimate the speed of a vehicle by
analyzing its influence on surrounding wireless signals from
roadside wireless infrastructures, such as WIFI. To achieve this
goal, in this paper it is proposed and formulated a model to
characterize the relationship between the phase and amplitude
measurements and the vehicle speed. Based on the model, a
method is developed that can detect the vehicle and estimate
its speed accordingly using the frequency domain information
involved in the spectrogram. However, this model estimates
vehicle’s speed by analysing the influence of the vehicle
on surrounding wireless signals using two static roadside
WIFI devices. In contrast, our proposed method estimates
the relative speed between two moving vehicles that can be
assumed as transmitter and receiver that interchange pilot
signals using the V2V wireless communication without the
need of any additional infrastructure.
The great majority of the works have used covariance-based
speed estimators. Some of them do not take into account the
shadowing effect of VANETs, others need initially sampling
of the SNR links for a training procedure and last some need
perfect knowledge about the directivity of transmitted waves
in order to estimate the receiver’s speed improving handover
algorithms between transmitter and receiver under a typical
micro-cellular systems. However, this type of network is as-
sumed to be relatively stable in contrast to a VANET where the
V2V channel yields more rapid and more severe fading than
cellular networks. All the remaining state-of-the-art papers for
speed estimation use extra hardware infrastructure, WSNs or
RSUs for traffic recording and therefore for position or speed
verification. Moreover, the speed estimation approaches that
use RSUs are not applicable for estimating the speed of a
jammer as indication of jamming in the area because a smart
jammer may change its travel behavior (i.e. speed, direction) in
order to look like a legitimate vehicle and remain undetected.
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Our proposed technique is the first in the literature, to the best
of our knowledge, that uses only the unicast communication
between two moving vehicles Tx and Rx for the prediction
of the jammer’s speed and for future detection of a jamming
attack without any initial knowledge about the location of
vehicles or the channel conditions. Our method uses this point-
to-point communication between Tx - Rx to gather as much
information as possible regarding jammer’s behavior, such as
all the combined multipath channels among Tx,Rx, Jx, jam-
mer’s relative speed value and jamming signal. The proposed
system is dynamic and can be applied to any road topology for
the jammer’s speed estimation. Moreover, there has been no
prior work that combines a feature of the physical location,
except of the AOA at the receiver, such as the AOP of the
Jx with its speed, in order to estimate relative speeds of two
moving vehicles (jammer - receiver) during a jamming attack,
using the channel Doppler shift value.
III. SYSTEM-MODEL & PRELIMINARIES
A. Network Topology
We consider unicast V2V communication between transmit-
ter and the receiver and a point-to-point V2V communication
between a single jammer and the receiver. This simple scenario
in a rural area is used for the initial verification of our system
without high interference of other vehicles. In this area, a
static obstacle already exists that impacts the communication
between Tx−Rx and Jx−Rx.
The jammer transmits wireless packets/signals that may
form a reactive jamming signal. We assume that the Tx−Rx
pair of vehicles in our model moves with a constant speed
for a period of time. This approach allows the modeling of
platoons of vehicles that are formed by maintaining a constant
distance with each other [2]. We assume that the jammer
moves with a constantly increasing speed with the ultimate
goal to approach the receiver and intervene in the effective
communication zone of the Tx−Rx pair. As it can be seen in
the network topology of Fig.1, the distances between Jx−Rx
in the y axis dy(Jx−Rx) and in the x axis dx(Jx−Rx) together
with the actual distance between Jx−Rx d(Jx−Rx), which is
the hypotenuse of the rectangular triangle that is formed. The
motion of the vehicles in Fig.1 is characterized by the speed
vectors (~uRx, ~uJx, ~uTx). Only ~uRx, ~uTx have the same direction,
which is the direction of the x axis. The jammer approaches
the Tx − Rx with an AOP (θ). So, the speed vector of the
jammer is projected in the axis of the motion of vector ~uRx
with an AOP (θ) Fig.2a. In this figure we also notice that
the AOP (θ) is not equal to zero. Moreover, the angle that
is formed between the speed vector of the jammer ~uJx, and
the wireless signal that travels between the Jx and the Rx, is
called the Angle of Departure (AOD) and is denoted as φ in
Fig.2. In Fig.2a the Line of Sight (LOS) component between
Jx - Rx has a AOD (φ) equal to zero, while the Non Line of
Sight (NLOS) component between Jx - Rx has a AOD (φ),
which is different to zero in Fig.2b.
B. System Overview
In our system model, K known pilot symbols that compose
the symbol vector ~xpilot = [xpilot(1)...xpilot(K)]T = [1...1]T
are being sent over consecutive K time instants from the
transmitter to the receiver. At the same time, the jammer
simultaneously transmits over consecutive K time instants K
jamming symbols to the receiver that compose the symbol
vector ~s = [s1...sK ]T . So we consider the received vector at
the receiver ~y = [y(1)y(2)...y(K)]T , which consists of the
combined symbols that the Rx receives from the transmitter
and the jammer at K consecutive time instants. Therefore, for
every time instant n ∈ (0,K] the receiver signal y(n) is the
summation of the pilot symbol sent by the transmitter xpilot(n)
and the symbol sent by the jammer sn. Using pilots, the LOS
channel and the N − 1 NLOS channels between Jx − Rx
are estimated by the receiver. The receiver can also define the
specific value of parameter N , which is the total numner of
multipath rays. The wireless channel is assumed to be constant
for the duration of the transmission of the K pilot symbols
from Tx to Rx.
C. Attacker Model
We consider jammers that aim to block completely the
communication over a link by emitting interference reactively
when they detect packets over the air, thus causing a DoS
attack. The jammers minimize their activity to only a few
symbols per packet and use minimal, but sufficient power,
to remain undetected. We assume that the jammer is able to
sniff any symbol of the packet over the air in real-time and
react with a jamming signal that flips selected symbols at the
receiver with high probability (see [45]).
The jammer is designed to start transmitting upon sensing
energy above a certain threshold in order a reactive jamming
attack to be succeed. We set the latter to −86dBm as it is
empirically determined to be a good tradeoff between jammer
sensitivity and false transmission detection rate, when an on-
going 802.11p transmission is assumed. So, the symbol vector
~s that reaches at the Rx from the Jx after K time instants has
the same length as the pilot symbol vector that reaches the Rx
from the Tx after K time instants, provided that the jammer
transmits only when senses a transmission from the transmitter.
Each one of the K scalar values depends on the used power
by the jammer. The jammer continuously transmits with the
same transmission power, with the purpose of overloading the
wireless medium representing, thus a DoS attack [46]. This
work assumes that when the jammer continuously transmits
the same jamming symbol to the receiver forming a simplified
jamming signal of the form ~s = [f...f ]T with length K and
f a random unknown value to the receiver. Furthermore, the
proposed RSEA can operate with a different form of jamming
signal. This is possible when the Tx sends more pilot symbols
to the Rx than the sum of the different unknown jamming
symbols being sent by the jammer.
Recall that the main goal of this paper is to show how
we can estimate the speed of an non-cooperative malicatious
attacker that can eventually be used as extra useful information
for the design of a RF jamming detection schemes [47].
D. Channel Model
Multipath is the propagation phenomenon that results in
radio signals reaching the receiving antenna by two or more
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paths. The multipath scenario illustrated in Fig.1 includes
a static obstacle in order for the multipath effects to be
considered in the communication between Tx - Rx and Jx
- Rx. So, it exists the LOS component of the wireless signal
being sent by the Jx, Tx and also the NLOS component.
In the NLOS component the AOP (θ) is not equal to zero
and the AOD (φ) between the speed vector of the jammer
and the NLOS ray is also not equal to zero (see Fig.2b).
The phenomenons of reflection, diffraction and scattering due
to the multipath give rise to additional radio propagation
paths beyond the direct optical LOS path between the radio
transmitter and receiver.
In our work, we adopt the Rician fading model, which is a
channel model that includes path loss and also Rayleigh fading
[48]. When a signal is transmitted the channel adds Rician
fading. The Rician fading model is particularly appropriate
when there is a direct propagating LOS component in addition
to the faded component arising from multipath propagation.
The Rician channel at time instant t is defined with the
help of multiple NLOS paths, which is similar to the Rayleigh
fading channel but with the addition of a strong dominant LOS
component. Parameter q defines the channel between Tx−Rx
with q = 1 and the channel between Jx−Rx with q = 2. We
define a complex Gaussian random variable ζG that is uniform
over the range [0, 2pi] and is fully specified by the variance σ2q .
The Rician fading channel can be defined with the help of this
random variable as:
hq[t] =
√
k
k + 1
σqe
j(2pi/λ)(fc+fd,max cosφq)τqδ(t− τq)
+
√
k
k + 1
ζG
(1)
In the above equation, fc is the carrier frequency, fd,max is
the maximum Doppler shift, φq the incidence AOD between
the vector of speed ~uJx with the vector of the jamming
signal, τq = d/c is the excess delay time for the LOS
ray that travels between the two communicating nodes in
channel hq , d corresponds to the distance between the two
communicating nodes and t is the current time instant. The
first term corresponds to the specular LOS path arrival and
the second, to the aggregate of the large number of reflected
and the scattered paths. Parameter k is the ratio of the energy
in the specular path to the energy in the scattered paths; the
larger k is, the more deterministic the channel is [49]. Finally,
(γq =
√
k
k+1σq) in (1) is the amplitude associated with the
LOS path, which is known at the receiver. Rician channel
model is often a better model of representing fading compared
to the Rayleigh model.
The channel response ~y after K consecutive symbols sent
by the jammer and the transmitter is:
~y =
N−1∑
l=0
(h1[l]~xpilot[N − l] + h2[l]~s[N − l]) + ~w (2)
In above equation, the ~y is a K× 1 column vector. Moreover,
~xpilot is the symbol vector that the Rx receives from the Tx
after K consecutive time instants and ~s is the symbol vector
that the Rx receives from the Jx after K consecutive time
instants again. The symbol vectors (~xpilot[N − l],~s[N − l])
have the same values, as defined above, for the l different
paths of the respective channels, where ∀l ∈ (0, N − 1].
The ~w represents the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN)
with zero mean. We assume, also, that the jammer and the
transmitter send at very close time instants their symbols at the
receiver, so that h1, h2 channels can remain stable for sending
K symbols. Moreover, N is the overall multipath rays in the
area. For the estimation of this parameter, we use the GEMV
simulator [50]. For describing the modeled area GEMV uses
the outlines of vehicles, buildings and foliage. Based on the
outlines of the objects, it forms R-trees. R-tree is a tree data
structure in which objects in the field are bound by rectan-
gles and are hierarchically structured based on their location
in space. Hence, GEMV employs a simple geometry-based
small-scale signal variation model and calculates the additional
stochastic signal variation and the number of diffracted and
reflected rays based on the information about the surrounding
objects. We must note that the wireless RF communication of
the Tx - Rx pair and the Jx - Rx pair is taking place in a
specific frequency band, according to the existing standard for
automotive systems[51].
E. Transmission in the MAC/PHY Layer
We assume single carrier communication at the PHY. The
802.11p MAC also provides prioritized Enhanced Distributed
Channel Access (EDCA), and can support applications by
providing different levels of Quality of Service (QoS). In our
model, only the 802.11p MAC EDCA AC[0] channel with
higher priority is used for the pilots. The pilot beacons from
the Tx to the Rx are transmitted with high probability of
successful delivery, increasing the accuracy of the proposed
RSEA at the same time. Any type of collisions at the wireless
channel resulting from competing traffic is addressed by the
MAC EDCA backoff mechanism for distances smaller than
the Carrier Sensing (CS) range of 1000m. So we assume that
our speed estimation algorithm has a correct reaction and for
high interference situations from other vehicles.
IV. LOCATION AWARE RELATIVE SPEED METRIC
One of the main novel ideas of this work, is that we take
into account the physical location of the Jx,Rx nodes and the
direction of their motion when calculating the relative speed
metric. In the general case, the Rx does not move in the same
direction as the Jx (see Fig.1). For this case, ∆u includes the
AOP (angle θ) of the Jx between Jx and Rx. The geometry-
aware metric takes into account the distance dy(Jx−Rx) and the
distance dx(Jx−Rx). So a rectangular triangle is formed by the
sides dx(Jx−Rx), d(Rx−Jx), dy(Jx−Rx). As it can be seen from
Fig.1, the distance d(Jx−Rx) is the hypotenuse of the rectangu-
lar triangle, which means that cos (θ) = dx(Jx−Rx)/d(Jx−Rx).
So, the speed of the Jx (Source) with respect to the Rx speed,
while the Jx and the Rx are moving in the same direction, is
the relative speed between the two vehicles moving towards
each other and is equal to the sum of their individual speed
vectors ∆~uline = ~uJx + ~uRx. Moreover, ~v = ~uTx||uTx|| is the unit
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Figure 2: Illustration of projections of velocities uJx on the
vector ~v. Two-dimensional scheme
length vector pointing from the Jx to the Tx. The relative
speed of the Jx and the Rx can be defined as the following
dot product:
∆u = ~v∆~uline (3)
To represent all the speed vectors of Fig.1 in two dimensions
(x, y), we project the vector ~uJx on the unit length vector ~v.
The direction of ~v is the x axis (see Fig.2). The projected
vector is ~uJx cos (θ). On the other hand, ~uRx is already a vector
in the direction of the x axis (see Fig.2), which has the same
direction as the projection of ~uJx. This allows the calculation
of the relative speed between Jx−Rx using the two vectors
(~uJx cos (θ), ~uRx) that have the same direction with the vector
~v.
In (3), if we use the projection vector ~uJx cos (θ) and the
~uRx vector, we get the final version of our metric, which is:
∆u = |~uJx(dx(Jx−Rx)/d(Jx−Rx)) +~uRx| = |~uJx cos (θ) +~uRx|
(4)
This is the ∆u metric in the direction of ~v. The addition is
justified by the fact that the vectors ~uJx cos (θ), ~uRx have the
same direction. In the above equation, ~uJx, ~uRx are the speed
vectors of the Jx and the Rx, respectively. According to our
model, if the Jx approaches the receiver, cos (θ) increases. As
the ~uRx remains constant and the ~uJx is constantly increasing,
(4) is an increasing function and its maximum value indicates
a nearby jamming attack.
As ∆u increases, the jammer approaches the receiver and
when ∆u decreases, the jammer is moving away from the Tx
and the Rx. If the Jx and the Rx are located on the same road,
an actual straight line and the vectors ~uJx, ~uRx, have the same
direction, then our metric is the sum between Jx−Rx speed
vectors (~uJx + ~uRx). Otherwise, if the vectors ~uJx, ~uRx have
opposite directions, our metric is estimated by the difference
(~uJx − ~uRx).
Taking into account the direction of the Jx relative to the
direction of the Rx the general form of the above metric is:
∆u = |~uJx cos (θ)± ~uRx| (5)
It is crucial to point out that the above metric is the actual
value of the relative speed that will be used in the subsequent
sections to model the Doppler shift between the jammer and
the receiver.
V. PROPOSED ESTIMATION SCHEME
A. Estimation of the Combined Pilot/Jamming Signal
The channel between two nodes with jamming is captured
in (2). For the proposed RSEA a pilot-based method for
channel estimation is used. So, the signals that Rx receives
from the Tx and the jammer interfere additively. In (2), if we
differentiate the one LOS component from the other N − 1
NLOS components, we have:
~rLOS = h
LOS
1 ~xpilot[N ] + h
LOS
2 ~s[N ] (6)
Where, the channel values hLOS1 = h1[0], h
LOS
2 [2] = h2[0]
and the symbol vectors ~xpilot[N ], ~s[N ] represent the unique
LOS component of the total N multipath values. If the NLOS
multipath components are added:
~y = ~rLOS +
N−1∑
l=1
(h1[l]~xpilot[N − l] + h2[l]~s[N − l]) + ~w (7)
In (7), the received vector ~y is the convolution between h1
and the pilot symbol vector ~xpilot and the convolution between
h2 and the jamming symbol vector ~s. Moreover, the K × 1
column received vector ~y for the K received values for every
time instant during which the receiver collects every pilot that
is sent from the transmitter is:
~y =
 rLOS[1] +
∑N−1
l=1 (h1[l] + h2[l]s1[N − l])
...
rLOS[K] +
∑N−1
l=1 (h1[l] + h2[l]sK [N − l])
+
 w1...
wK

(8)
To estimate the channel between Tx - Rx (h1), the channel
between Jx - Rx (h2) and the jamming symbol vector ~s, the
best we can do is to estimate the combined vector parameter:
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~z =

∑N−1
l=0 (h1[l]xpilot[N − l] + h2[l]s1[N − l])
...∑N−1
l=0 (h1[l]xpilot[N − l] + h2[l]sK [N − l])
 (9)
Vector ~z has the above form for the short time that is
required by the receiver to collect all the K symbols of the
pilot vector. Recall that for a short time duration, the wireless
channel is assumed constant. So for all the K values of vector
~z in (9), the parameters h1[l], h2[l], xpilot[N−l] remain constant
and only the jamming symbols may change depending on the
form of the jamming symbol vector sent by the jammer. We
use a MMSE estimator [52], which finds a better estimate from
least squares (LS), in order the K values of ~z to be estimated:
~ˆz = (~xHpilotC
−1
w ~xpilot)
−1~xHpilotC
−1
w ~y (10)
Cw is the covariance matrix of the noise vector ~w. Vector ~z
in (10) has K components each having N unknown multipath
channel components. So, both the h1, h2 channels can be
estimated and also the K values of the jamming signal ~s can
be estimated too.
If the simplified jamming signal is used1, in which the
jammer continuously sends the same jamming symbol, which
is unknown to the Rx, we have 2N unknown values for
the two channels h1, h2 with K equations in (9) and one
unknown value for the jamming symbol f . So if the condition
K > 2N +1 is valid, we can see that each one of the channel
values h1, h2 out of N multipath values can be estimated with
the elimination method for the solution of the linear system
with K equations and 2N unknown values in (9). The values
of the wireless channels h1, h2 remain constant for each value
of vector ~z. Moreover, the above linear system can also be
solved with a completely irregular form of jamming signal
provided that the length of the pilot symbol vector ~xpilot being
sent from the Tx to the Rx is larger than the sum of the
number of the unknown jamming symbols with the value of
parameter2 2N . We only utilize the LOS component of the
vector ~z for the estimation of the relative speed metric using
Doppler shift. So, the useful part from vector ~z that we need
for the relative speed estimation through the Doppler shift is
~rLOS = (
 hLOS1 + hLOS2 s1...
hLOS1 + h
LOS
2 sK
). If we only want to estimate
the hLOS1 , h
LOS
2 values of vector ~rLOS without the multipath
values, the above conditions for the solution of the linear
system in (8) can be simplified to K > 3 for the simplified
jamming signal form.
B. Proposed Algorithm
The proposed RSEA is presented in Algorithm 1. First, the
Tx specifies the number of multipath rays N in the area
that the GEMV propagation model is used, as explained in
subsection III-D. Then, the RSEA is used for every time step
1~s = [f...f ]T
2which is the double number of overall multipath rays in the area for the
estimation of both h1, h2 channels
Algorithm 1 Relative Speed Estimation Algorithm (RSEA)
1: N % It is specified by the Tx for the specific area using
the GEMV propagation model.
2: for Every time step (tRSEA) A pilot signal with K =
2N + 2 symbols being sent from Tx to Rx do
3: N % It is re-specified by the Tx for the specific area
using the GEMV propagation model.
4: ~ˆz ← MMSE(~y, C−1w )
5: ~rLOS ← (
 hLOS1 + hLOS2 s1...
hLOS1 + h
LOS
2 sK
) %LOS components
6: if ((K > 2N+1) )) % and ~s has the simplified jamming
signal form then
7: ~ˆrLOS ← (
 hLOS1 + hLOS2 s...
hLOS1 + h
LOS
2 s
) % The ~rLOS and ~z
values can be estimated.
8: rˆLOS[1]− hLOS1 = (a1 + b1j)s
9: end if
10: ∆ˆu Estimation % estimated relative speed value from
(8)
11: end for
with the transmission of a pilot that consists of K = 2N + 2
symbols. In line 4 of the algorithm the combined channel
between the Tx and the Rx, with the intervention of the
Jx, is estimated from the vector ~y using a MMSE estimator.
Depending on the jamming signal, the inequality that must
be valid for the RSEA system to be resolvable for all the
N multipath values is different. In the final 10th line of the
RSEA, the relative speed value is estimated. A component
rˆLOS[1] of the estimated vector of the combined LOS channels
~ˆrLOS
3 can be combined with the ray-optical baseband complex-
number (a1 + b1j)s1, which is the jamming signal that the
Rx finally receives from the Jx. Specifically, the subtraction
of the channel hLOS1 component from the rˆLOS[1] value can
be set equal to the ray-optical baseband complex-number
(a1 + b1j)s1. The complex number (a1 + b1j)s1 characterizes
the baseband form of the narrowband wireless channel. This
narrowband wireless channel is a function of the relative speed
∆u between the jammer and receiver and the Doppler shift
between the two moving objects.
C. Channel Model with Doppler Shift
In this subsection, we describe in more detail the wireless
LOS combined channel model hLOS1 + h
LOS
2 between Tx -
Rx and Jx - Rx. The proposed relative speed value ∆u can
be estimated using only the LOS combined channel models.
The tracked LOS components also show fading characteristics,
likely due to the ground reflection which cannot be resolved
from the true LOS. For this reason, we choose the same
model for the LOS component as for the discrete components.
Small scale fading characteristics do not affect significantly the
3Each one of the K components of ~rLOS has the same combined channel
values
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communication between Tx and Rx, as compared to NLOS
conditions, and therefore the ∆u estimation procedure. So
central to this paper, is the introduction of the proposed metric
∆u in the channel model of (1), taking into account the
pathloss value at the receiver. This pathloss value only depends
on the distance between the communicating nodes and usually
gets small values for a narrowband wireless channel. Let us
consider the channel model such as defined by the Rx for a
ray transmitted between two nodes as [53]:
2∑
q=1
hLOSq (t, τq) =
2∑
q=1
γqpoqe
j(2pi/λ)(fc+fd,max cosφq)τqδ(t− τq)
(11)
In the above equation, q defines the channel between
Tx − Rx with q = 1 and the channel between Jx − Rx
with q = 2, γq is the amplitude associated with the LOS
path and poq represents the free space propagation loss [54],
λ is the wavelength, fc the carrier frequency, fd,max is the
maximum Doppler shift that depends on the ∆u metric such
as in (3), φq is the incidence AOD between the vector of
speed ~uJx and the vector of the jamming signal, (τq = d/c)
is the excess delay time that the ray travels between the
two nodes, and t is the current time instant. We assume the
LOS case for the communication between the jammer and the
receiver, as can be seen in Fig.2a. The LOS ray between the
Jx and the Rx has the same direction with the speed vector
of the jammer. As a consequence the AOD is equal to zero
(cosφq = 1, in (11)). The observed frequency at the receiver is
f ′ = fc(1 + ∆uc cosφq), which depends on the relative speed
∆u of the two vehicles (jammer, receiver) that we defined in
the previous subsection. The baseband channel model for a
ray transmitted between two nodes with the intervention of a
jammer therefore becomes:
2∑
q=1
hLOSq (t, τq) =
2∑
q=1
γqpoqe
j(2pi/λ)fc(1+
∆u
c cosφq)τqδ(t− τq)
(12)
We can see that the Doppler shift ∆f Hz that is observed
in the Rx can be equal with [55]:
∆f =
∆ufc cosφq
c
(13)
And the maximum Doppler shift is:
fd,max =
∆u
c
(14)
Now, let τq be the time that is required for a signal to travel
the distance d. Then, we can re-write hLOS2 from (12) as:
hLOS2 (t, τ2) = γ2po2e
j(2pi/λ)fc(1+
∆u
c )
d
c δ(t− (d
c
)) (15)
In the above equation, we use a fc = 5, 9Ghz, which
is the band dedicated to V2V communication. The channel
hLOS2 (t, τ2) is also the channel of a baseband signal in (15)
and if (∆uc >> 1) has the form:
hLOS2 (t, τ2) = γ2po2e
j(2pi/λ)(fc
∆u
c )
d
c δ(t− (d
c
)) (16)
To get our final signal model, we replace the path-loss
parameter po2 with equation:
po2 = G0,p(
dref
d
)np (17)
Where, G0,p is the received power at a reference distance dref ,
which is a standard value at about 100m, np is the path-loss
exponent, which is equal to 2 for the pure LOS links and d is
the distance that the transmitted ray travels between the two
communicating nodes. So, po2 only depends on the distance
d that the ray travels. We denote ∆t = tRSEAi − tRSEAi−1 as
the time interval between the current time instant and the
preceding one, in which the RSEA is reapplied (tRSEAi−1 ).
Furthermore, if hLOS2 (t, τ2) represents the channel between
the Rx - Jx pair, the distance between the two nodes after the
time interval ∆t is d = ∆u∆t, when the jammer approaches
the receiver. Substituting (17) into (16), hLOS2 can be rewritten
as:
hLOS2 (t, τ2) = γ2G0,p(
dref
∆u∆t
)2ej(2pi/λ)(fc
∆u
c
)τ2δ(t− (d
c
))
(18)
In the above equation, the only unknown parameter is ∆u
at time t. Reorganizing (18) we have:
hLOS2 (t, τ2) = γ2G0,p(
d2ref
∆u2∆t2
)δ(t− (d
c
))(cos (ω2)
+ j sin (ω2))
(19)
where, ω2 = (2pi/λ)(fc∆uc )τ2. In the above equation, the only
unknown parameter is ∆u.
For the LOS channel between Tx−Rx, we know that the
receiver moves with the same speed as the transmitter, such
as a platoon of vehicles with two members. The above means
that the Doppler phenomenon is non-existent. Following (16)
for the formulation of the channel hLOS1 without the existence
of Doppler phenomenon, we can see that this channel only de-
pends on the path-loss component and the complex amplitude
associated with the LOS path. The path-loss component po1
and the complex amplitude variable γ1 can be estimated by
the receiver. So the hLOS1 can be represented by a complex
number:
hLOS1 (t, τ1) = γ1po1e
0 = aTx−Rx + bTx−Rxj (20)
Reformulating the combined value of the LOS channels
(hLOS1 ,h
LOS
2 ) in (12) by combining equations (20), (19), we
have:
2∑
q=1
hLOSq (t, τqi) = γ1po1
+ γ2G0,p(
d2ref
∆u2∆t2
)δ(t− (d
c
))(cos (ω2)
+ j sin (ω2))
(21)
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D. Relative Speed Estimation
At this point we have an estimate of the baseband channel
hLOS2 between Jx − Rx, which can be represented with a
complex number. The final baseband signal that reaches at the
receiver after the intervention of the jammer can be represented
as (a1 + b1j)s. From Algorithm 1, we know that the jamming
symbols of the symbol vector ~s is part of the vector ~rLOS.
So, if from the estimated combined value rˆLOS we subtract
the channel hLOS1 , which can be estimated by the receiver,
the value (rˆLOS − hLOS1 = hLOS2 s) can be set equal to the
baseband received signal at the receiver:
rˆLOS − hLOS1 = (a1 + b1j)s (22)
From the above equation, as well:
hLOS2 s = (a1 + b1j)s (23)
Reusing the (19) from the previous Section, the ray-optical
baseband complex number (a1 + b1j) can be set equal with:
(a1 + b1j)s = γ2G0,p(
d2ref
∆u2∆t2
)δ(t− (d
c
))(cos (ω2)Re(s)
+ j sin (ω2)Im(s))
(24)
where, ω2 = (2pi/λ)(fc∆uc )τ2. The jamming signal ~s is es-
timated by the receiver from Algorithm 1. So the Re(s), Im(s)
are known values to the receiver. From the above equation, we
can calculate the desired parameters a1, b1:
a1/(γ2G0,p(
d2refδ(t− ( dc ))
∆u2∆t2
)) = cos ((2pi/λ)(fc
∆u
c
)τ2) (25)
b1/(γ2G0,p(
d2refδ(t− (dc ))
∆u2∆t2
)) = sin ((2pi/λ)(fc
∆u
c
))τ2)
(26)
From (25),(26) and with the use of the Euler identity, we have:
cos((2pi/λ)(fc
∆u
c
))τ2)
2 + sin((2pi/λ)(fc
∆u
c
))τ2)
2 = 1
(27)
In (27) there is only one unknown variable ∆u. So, we can
calculate ∆u as:
∆̂u =
4
√√√√G20,pγ22d4refδ(t− (dc ))2
∆t4(a21 + b
2
1)
(28)
From the above equation, we can see that the estimated
∆̂u value depends only on the excess delay time τ2 = dc that
is caused by the Doppler phenomenon and not on the actual
value of Doppler shift.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Evaluation Setup
Our evaluation scenario is conducted on the outskirts of the
city of Aachen, representing a real-word environment; while
assuming that this is a rural area. Our experimental setup
considers unicast data transmissions in a network consisting
of three nodes: a transmitter, a receiver and a jammer, and
V2X broadcast communication for 10 interfering vehicles
Jx
Start of Effective 
Zone
Start of 
Communication 
Zone
Δt_eff
Figure 3: Graphical Representation of the ∆teff from the
Tx−Rx pair between the Communication Zone and Effective
Zone of the Jx.
outside of the CS range between the Tx and the Rx (distance
more than 1000m). Two different moving RF jamming attacks
scenarios are evaluated. Analyzing RF Jammer Behavior 1
VI-C, the Tx - Rx pair (see Fig.1) travels with a constant
speed of approximately 50Km/h and with constant distance
of approximately 20m, as a platoon of vehicles. The Jx is also
moving on a side road with zero initial speed and accelerates
to a maximum speed of 60Km/h in order to approach the Tx
- Rx pair. In RF Jammer Behavior 2 VI-D the transmitter
and the receiver travel with constant speed of approximately
48Km/h when the jammer approaches the crossroads, as
illustrated in Fig.3, with accelerating speed and a maximum
limit of 50km/h.
Our experiments are conducted using the Veins-Sumo sim-
ulator [56] with the simulation parameters presented in Table I
such as: The initial distance between the jammer and the pair
of Rx - Tx, dJx−Rx, the distance that separates the receiver
from the transmitter throughout the course of the simulation
dTx−Rx . The closest distance in which the jammer arrives
relative to the Tx - Rx pair as well as the power of all the
transmitted signals PTx,Jx . The time interval ∆t after RSEA
is reapplied. The specific value of the parameter N , which is
the number of the multipath rays. Last, the standard reference
distance dref is used for the estimation of the LOS path loss
component.
As illustrated in Fig.3, there is a time interval ∆teff , in
which the transmitter can effectively communicate with the
receiver. It starts with the ’Start of Communication Zone’ and
ends with the ’Start of the Effective Zone’ of the Jx. After
the start of the effective zone of the Jx, the jammer is located
at distances smaller than 30m away from the receiver and
it can completely jam the communication between the Tx
and the Rx by constructing a ’Black hole’. All the evaluation
parameters are summarized in Table III.
During the performance evaluation we test our proposed
RSEA with different SINR values for two real-life scenarios.
When the jamming vehicle is approaching the Tx - Rx pair,
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Table I: Simulation Parameters
Evaluation Parameters in Veins Simulator Values
dTx,Rx 20m
[CW [min], CW [max]] [3,7]
Vehicle’s Transmission Range 130-300m
Initial dJx−Rx 300m
CS range of 802.11p protocol 1000m
Interfering vehicles outside of CS range Tx−Rx 10
dJx−Rx at ”Black hole” 25m
PTx,Jx 100mW
Minimum sensitivity (Pth) -69dBm to -85dBm
fc 5.9GHz
Doppler shift for ∆u = 120km/h ±655.5 Hz
dref 100m
∆t 2s
N 4
the SINR is:
SINR =
||h1~xpilot||2
||h2~s||2 + σ2n
(29)
The SINR level is measured by the receiver at the PHY
layer. In the above equation, the noise power σ2n is the noise
power. Moreover, the Mean Absolute Error (MAE) between
the real ∆u value and the estimated is calculated for both
scenarios. This is the difference between the actual relative
speed metric ∆u with the estimated relative speed metric ∆ˆu.
MAE =
1
ns
|∆ui − ∆ˆui| (30)
where i is an integer number that identified with the current
time instant in which the real and the estimated ∆u variable
have a specific value and ns = 10 is the number of measure-
ments for the specific speed value. The MAE value gets its
optimal zero value when the real ∆u is identified with the
estimated. We assume this optimal value as a reference point
for the MAE(%) calculations for the rest of the paper.
B. Speed Estimators Comparison
All state-of-the-art recent papers from 2014 onwards for
speed estimation, along with the proposed one, are summa-
rized and compared under specific conditions in Table II.
These articles fall into some specific categories. Some of
the papers use RSUs installed on the side of the road that
can detect a vehicle and estimate its speed by analysing the
influence of the vehicle on surrounding wireless signals from
roadside wireless infrastructures (see [27],[29], [44]). In the
same category belong the articles that require static nodes
with specific magnetic sensors to collect the earths magnetic
field and estimate the speed of a vehicle by calculating the
similarity of vehicle signatures between these static nodes (see
[42]). Last, recent papers such as [43] use ViLDAR systems
to estimate a vehicle’s speed using received light power
(intensity) variations of an vehicles headlamps as transmitter
and static photodetectors as receiver through visible light
communication (VLC). Moreover, some papers need static
cameras located at the roads for the speed estimation procedure
([40], [41]). However, these methods require the deployment of
many RSUs or additional hardware to estimate vehicle speed
over a large section of the road and therefore are highly costed.
The methods that use RSUs for estimating the speed of an RF
jammer are not applicable additionally because a smart jammer
may change its travel behavior (i.e. speed, direction) in order
to look like a legitimate vehicle and thus remain undetected.
Another categoty of papers use specific hardware embedded
in the vehicle such as UCA antennas, RADAR, LIDAR for
the speed estimation [29]. These techniques are also very
expensive. Some papers need also big or medium training data
for the speed estimation using either complicated kinematic
models [27] or the autocorrelation between two time-series
of WIFI signals using different samples of SNR data [36].
Similarly, some papers must use a proper (relatively large)
window size for collecting training data for performing speed
estimation [44]. A last category of articles deal with some of
the limitations that impose on the speed estimation process.
Specifically, some of the papers assume moving vehicles with
speed limits of up to 60km/h which corresponds to relatively
low sampling rates required for the WIFI hardware used[29],
[44]. However, a great challenge of V2V communication are
the high Doppler shifts due to the fast moving communicating
vehicles. Such corresponding limiting factors for a VANET
may be the high computational time or the applicability of
the method only to relevant static nodes such as applications
for estimating speed directly from signal strength profiles of
mobile phones.
Concluding, it is obvious that the proposed RSEA method
is the only in the state-of-the art literature that estimates the
relative speed of a jammer with a completely passive scheme
that is based on RF communication between Tx-Rx with the
interference of a jammer in the area, without extra cost for
adding sensors or hardware. Moreover, we can conclude that
the proposed method is the only in the literature that combines
the physical orientation of the vehicles in the considering
jamming scenario with the relative speed ∆u between Jx -
Rx without extra sensors. Last, the proposed method is the
only that does not susceptible to high Doppler shift or relative
speed values that are observed in V2V communication. It may
be noted that later in this section the proposed RSEA will be
evaluated on a wide range of jammer speed values.
C. Results of RF Jammer Behavior 1
In RF Jammer Behavior 1, we assume that the pair Tx -
Rx moves with a high constant speed (50 Km/h) when the
jammer accelerates with a higher maximum speed (60 Km/h),
while transmitting a jamming signal with a simplified form
to the receiver. The first figure of Fig.4a shows a comparison
between the real ∆u and the estimated value. Specifically, by
observing the start time of the steep slope of SINR in Fig.5b,
we can conclude that it coincides with the start of the jamming
attack, the 15.5 sec. The main reason for the sharp decrease
of the SINR in our experiment is the jamming attack and not
the interference from the entire environment. In that case the
total received power at the Rx is also increased indicating
the jamming attack. Moreover, in Fig.4a, after 15.5 sec, for
which ∆u is above 20 rad*m/s, the SINR in Fig.4b has also a
steep slope. So, the effective zone of communication between
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Table II: State-of-the-art speed estimation methods limitations
Categories [26] [28] [35] ([39]) [40] [42] [41] [43] [RSEA]
RSU, Static Sensors, Static Cameras 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Extra Sensors on Vehicles (UCA) 7
Limitations (Speed limit) 7 7 7
Training Data 7 7 7
Table III: Evaluation scenario parameters
Independent parameters RF jammer 1 RF jammer 2
Tx - Rx velocity 50 Km/h 48 Km/h
Jx velocity 60 Km/h 50 Km/h
∆teff 15.5 sec 18 sec
”Black hole” of communication 13.5 sec 18 sec
Time of ∆u peak 23.4 sec 25 sec
Tx and Rx is approximately ∆teff = 15.5 secs, whilst after
that it is corrupted for 13.5 secs. So, the ’black-hole’ in the
communication range between the Tx and the Rx is during
the time interval (15.5 secs- 29 secs). After 29 secs, we have
the end of the attack. For this time interval (15.5 secs- 29
secs), the MAE of our proposed RSEA increases to 23% from
the optimal MAE value (see Fig 6).
In Fig.4a, we can see that ∆u reaches a maximum value,
approximately 32.5 rad* m/s, at the time instant 23.4 sec. At
this time, Jx is approaching the Tx - Rx pair in the main road,
which is illustrated in Fig.3. The average MAE for the duration
of RF Jammer Behavior 1 is approximately 13% worse than
the optimal value.
D. Results of RF Jammer Behavior 2
For the second evaluation scenario, we assume that the
pair Tx - Rx travels with constant speed (48 Km/h), which
is almost the same as the maximum speed of the jammer
(50 Km/h) (see Fig.5). The jammer continuously transmits
a random jamming symbol to the receiver. The start time
of the jamming attack is at 18 secs during which the SINR
appears to be decreasing from 5dB to zero while ∆u starts
to increase from 20 rad*m/s to the ’peak’ value of ∆u. The
time that is needed for the Jx to approach the pair Tx - Rx is
approximately ∆teff = 18 secs. After that time, the jamming
attack clearly has perfect results for 18 secs; from the 18 secs
of the simulation until 36 secs, after that SINR increases more
than 5 dB.
If the ∆u slope is positive, the Jx approaches the Rx, whilst
if it goes to zero, Jx is removed from the effective zone of
communication between the Tx and the Rx. The ’black-hole’
in the communication between the Tx and the Rx is around
the time interval (18 secs - 36 secs), during which the MAE
value increases to approximately 18% from the optimal MAE
value.
In Fig.5, we can see that the average MAE for the complete
duration of RF Jammer Behavior 2 is approximately 10%
worse than the optimal value, as it is shown also in Fig.6
E. MAE comparison between RF Jammer Behavior 1 and RF
Jammer Behavior 2
The overall comparison of the MAE results between RF
Jammer Behavior 1 (Jammer 1) and RF Jammer Behavior
2 (Jammer 2) is summarized in Table IV. Fig.6 shows that
there is a quite small MAE, only 15% greater than the MAE
value at the start and end of simulation. However, when the
jammer approaches the receiver the MAE shows an increase
of about 23% from the optimal value for RF Jammer Behavior
1 and 18% for RF Jammer Behavior 2. The phenomenon of
the larger MAE at the time of the jamming attack for RF
Jammer Behavior 1 compared to that of RF Jammer Behavior
2 is attributed to the fast varying nature of the ∆u metric,
because it changes with a higher rate and thus, the channel
between the Jx and the Rx changes frequently too. So, the
longer the duration of the jamming attack lasts the better the
MAE results of the proposed RSEA are.
In order to test our previous results under more generic
scenarios, the average MAE is estimated for different jammer
speed values and different number of ”hidden” nodes that are
located at the edge of the CS range of the Tx − Rx pair.
Specifically we conducted several simulations, for a range of
jammer speed values between [47, 97]Km/h and number of
”hidden” nodes between [0, 50] nodes. For these parameters,
the MAE value increases at approximately 20% from the
reference zero MAE value with the maximum jammer speed
value (see Fig.7b) and at approximately 19, 2% from the
same reference value with the maximum number of ”hidden”
nodes, which is 50 nodes (see Fig.7a). For values greater than
67km/h regarding the speed metric and 30 ”hidden” nodes,
the MAE was increasing with a higher rate. For smaller values
of these two ”side- effect” values, the increase of MAE value is
negligible. So these simulation results indicate that the backoff
MAC/EDCA algorithm, using a safety-related high priority
channel for the communication between Tx − Rx, does not
affect considerably the performance of the speed estimation
algorithm. The jammer’s speed increase, also, affects but not
significantly the proposed RSEA.
Table IV: RF Jammer Behavior comparison results of
MAE(%) increase from the optimal zero MAE reference point.
Time Intervals MAE (Jammer 1) MAE (Jammer 2)
”Black hole” of communication 23% 18%
∆teff 8% 6%
Overall Simulation Time 13% 10%
VII. DISCUSSION
In Section VI we tested our proposed RSEA under different
SINR values in order to represent realistic conditions. When
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there is a decreased steep slope of the SINR values, a jamming
attack is conducted in the area. At the same time, the relative
speed value ∆u, as defined in (4), presents an increased
steep slope, indicating a jamming attack. Furthermore, when
the jammer approaches the receiver the MAE of the RSEA
presents a significant increase due to the packet loss of the
pilots sent by the Tx to Rx due to the presence of jammer.
This results in the incorrectly estimation of the stochastic V2V
channel between Jx and Rx, increasing also the correspond-
ing MAE of the ∆u value.
V2X communication generally uses broadcast messages, but
in this paper we use unicast RF communication between two
nodes in order to perform jammer’s speed estimation. This
type of communication is supported for advanced safety ap-
plications of autonomous vehicles by the Qualcomm’s Cellular
Vehicle-to-Everything (C-V2X) technology [57]. The target of
this paper is to evaluate the performance of the RSEA for a
pair of moving nodes with limited conditions, having as a
future objective to be used in a real-life VANET scenario for
more than one pair of nodes. Peer to peer networks in vanets
are studied lately in many other works [58]–[61], focusing
mostly on social networks message exchange, cooperative
caching or unicast video streaming.
Relative speed estimation results from our proposed RSEA
can be collected from a Trusted Central Authority (TCA) that
exists in the area. Analyzing these collected data records,
the TCA make deductions based on the SINR value, notify
approaching vehicles and even propose jamming free routes
[62].
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we presented an algorithm for estimating
the combined value ∆u of the relative speed between Rx
and Jx in combination with the AOP of the Jx, during a
jamming attack. A simplified jamming signal is sent to the
receiver by the jammer, that contains an unknown symbol to
the receiver K times. The proposed relative speed metric can
capture both the speed of the jammer and its direction relative
to the Tx - Rx movement. By predicting the above value,
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Figure 7: Average MAE(%) increase from the optimal zero MAE reference point with different evaluation parameters: The
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we can understand jammer’s behavior, for which Rx does not
have any information except for the combined signal that is
received from Tx and the interference caused by the attacker.
Our proposed RSEA uses the physical metric of ∆u from RF
communication Tx−Rx in order to estimate the direction of
the attacker. This metric is combined with the SINR value
from the hardware (physical layer) in order for a real-life
VANET scenario to be simulated. The MAE measured is being
approximately only 10% worse compared to the optimal zero
MAE value under different jamming attach scenarios.
As future work, we plan to combine RSEA with other
metrics from the PHY layer or the network layer, such as
SINR, for developing an accurate cross-layer jamming detec-
tion scheme. The detection scheme will be capable to deal
with more than one pair of nodes that communicate in a
broadcast form. This combined metric can be also used as
an extra feature in a machine-learning approach (see [63]), in
which the vehicles of the area can be classified as cooperative
or malicious, thereby forming a trusted vehicular network.
The usage of the relative speed metric can also reduce false
alarms and can provide additional information about the future
position of a Jx, such as the time that the attacker will
approach the effective zone of communication. The above in-
formation extracted from our channel based Jx - Rx analysis,
can decrease false alarms compared to jamming prediction
schemes that are based only on the 802.11p PHY/MAC related
metrics (see the DJAVAN in [64]), concluding the physical
geographical topology of the attacker. Last but not least, this
metric is appropriate for a variety of jamming attacks.
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